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The role of negative cognition and effect in maintaining
psychotic symptoms is increasingly recognized but has
yet to be substantiated though longitudinal analysis. Based
on an a priori theoretical model, we hypothesized that neg-
ative cognition and depressedmood play a direct causal role
in maintaining paranoia in people with psychosis and that
the effect of mood is mediated by negative cognition. We
used data from the 301 patients in the Prevention of Re-
lapse in Psychosis Trial of cognitive behavior therapy.
They were recruited from consecutive Community Mental
Health Team clients presenting with a recent relapse of
psychosis. The teams were located in inner and outer Lon-
don and the rural county of Norfolk, England. The study
followed a longitudinal cohort design, with initial measures
repeated at 3 and 12 months. Structural equation modeling
was used to investigate the direction of effect between neg-
ative cognition, depressed mood, and paranoia. Overall fit
was ambiguous in some analyses and confounding by un-
identified variables cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless,
the most plausible models were those incorporating path-
ways from negative cognition and depressed mood to para-
noid symptoms: There was no evidence whatsoever for
pathways in the reverse direction. The link between de-
pressed mood and paranoia appeared to be mediated by
negative cognition. Our hypotheses were thus corrobo-
rated. This study provides evidence for the role of negative
cognition in the maintenance of paranoia, a role of central
relevance, both to the design of psychological interventions
and to the conceptualizations of psychosis.
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Introduction
It is increasingly apparent that the etiology of psychosis is
extremely complex and must include psychosocial inter-
actions as well as neurobiological predispositions. A
number of cognitive models have been proposed over
the last decade to integrate the cognitive, social, and emo-
tional processes believed to contribute both to the occur-
rence and to the persistence of positive psychotic
symptoms.1–6 There are equivalent models of individual
symptoms, such as persecutory delusions7,8 and auditory
hallucinations.9 The models were derived from early em-
pirical findings and from the experience of delivering cog-
nitive behavior therapy (CBT) to people with psychosis:
They had the specific intention of shaping research pro-
grammes. Although they differ somewhat in emphasis,
they cohere in postulating psychological mechanisms
that include both an increased vulnerability to anxiety
and depression and biases in the cognitive processing
of events and experiences.
The proposed role of dysfunctional thinking and emo-
tional dysregulation in the development andmaintenance
of psychosis is increasingly supported by research.1,10–13
In particular, there is now evidence from epidemiological,
questionnaire, experimental, and treatment studies that
negative cognition (low self-esteem, self-critical thinking,
and extreme negative beliefs about self and others) and
depressed mood can contribute to the development of
symptoms of psychosis.12–26
However, previous studies showing associations be-
tween positive psychotic symptoms, negative cognition,
and mood have relied on cross-sectional designs that
inevitably constrain causal inference. We ourselves
have used such cross-sectional designs to demonstrate
that extreme negative beliefs about self and others, and
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cognition (9 items; eg, self-dislike) and affective-somatic
feelings (12 items; eg, loss of pleasure) and has been
shown to have good psychometric properties. Moreover,
it has been used in many studies with patients with psy-
chosis33 and correlated at 0.91 with the interview-based
Calgary Depression Scale for Schizophrenia.34
Analysis Plan
SEM is a confirmatory data analysis technique. The ap-
proach is theoretically driven, allowing a priori theoret-
ical models to be applied to observed data, following
which goodness of fit can be ascertained. We took a 2-
step approach to the analysis, as follows.
Latent Variable Identification. The SEM technique
encourages the creation of factors that incorporate
more than 1 source of measurement for any 1 single con-
struct. The present analysis used 3 such factors: paranoia,
negative cognition, and depressed mood.
Paranoia The paranoia latent variable was predicted
by the ‘‘persecutory delusions’’ item from the SAPS (item
8) and the ‘‘suspiciousness/persecution’’ item from the
PANSS (item P6). The factor loadings of these items
were 0.89 and 0.94, respectively.
Negative Cognition The main hypotheses of the
present study required a negative cognition latent vari-
able. For this purpose, we combined the negative belief
about self-subscale of the BCSS and the negative cogni-
tion subscale of the BDI-II (factor loadings of 0.82 and
0.86, respectively). We could have based our primary
modeling on a negative cognition latent variable based
only on BCSS subscales. However, we have already
reported that there is considerable independence
between the different aspects of beliefs about self and
others identified by the BCSS.27 As a result, the
prediction of individual BCSS subscales to the latent
variable was uneven, with factor loadings of individual
subscales of negative self, 0.77; negative other, 0.58; pos-
itive self, �0.43; and positive other, �0.32. The negative
schema factor was thereby made less stable for modeling
purposes. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we
also report on models obtained by constructing the neg-
ative cognition latent variable only from the BCSS
variables.
DepressedMood The depressed mood latent variable
was predicted by the combination of the individual items
of affective-somatic factor of the BDI-II as suggested by
the original psychometric analysis of the scale. It thus
excluded the negative cognitions subscale of the BDI-II.
ModelHypotheses. In the second stage of analysis, a se-
ries of 3-wave panel analyses (using data from baseline, 3-
month, and 12-month assessments) were conducted using
MPlus version 435 to test the longitudinal relationships of
negative cognition and depressed mood with paranoia. A
nested model comparison approach was used to assess
relative changes in goodness of fit associated with the ad-
dition of paths between constructs.36 A number of theo-
retically plausible models were identified a priori, and our
hypotheses were tested by comparing the fit of thesemod-
els. The comparison of goodness of fit was examined by
chi-square tests, the root mean square error of approxi-
mation (RMSEA),37 and the comparative fit index
(CFI).38
Following recommendations for nested model
designs,36 the starting point of the panel wave analysis
was the estimation of the model consisting solely of auto-
correlations, ie, the correlations between earlier and later
time points within the variables (paranoia, negative cog-
nition, and depressed mood). We then tested hypotheses
through the sequential addition of specific pathways be-
tween variables. First, we assessed the significance of
changes in model fit resulting from the addition to the
autocorrelational model of directional pathways leading
from paranoia either to negative cognition or to de-
pressed mood. Next, we assessed the significance of add-
ing to the autocorrelational model the directional
pathways leading in the opposite direction, from negative
cognition or from depressed mood to paranoia. If the ad-
ditional pathways in either direction improved model fit
significantly, the third step was to assess whether the in-
corporation of both directions of effect (ie, a reciprocal
model) improved fit still further. The guiding principle in
this hypothesis testing approach is that if adding a given
path does not significantly improve the fit, themodel with
fewer paths (thereby the more parsimonious) must be
regarded as superior.
This sequence was followed in the analysis of 3 differ-
ent kinds of theoretically plausible model, which were
set up a priori for testing against the autocorrelational
model. To understand these models, it may be helpful to
inspect the path diagrams in figures 1–3 in conjunction
with the text at this point. The first type was a cross-sec-
tional (sometimes called recursive) model incorporating
only the within-time point paths linking paranoia with
negative cognition or depressed mood (as in figures 1a
and 2a). The second type was a cross-lagged model (as in
figures 1b and 2b). These models contained cross-lagged
paths between variables at time t and variables at time
tþ 1. They are a more powerful test of the plausibility of
causal directions because of the temporal displacement
of the measurements. The third type of model (shown in
the tables but not in the figures) included both cross-sec-
tional and cross-lagged links.
Finally, in figure 3, we illustrate a model showing the
impact on paranoia of depressed mood and negative
cognition in combination. The purpose of this model
was to test the hypotheses that negative cognition would
have the strongest independent associations with para-
noia and would mediate the effect of the affective-so-
matic dimension of depressed mood on paranoia.
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depressed mood were independently associated with per-
secutory delusions.27,28 These findings are consistent with
others indicating a role for negative cognition in psy-
chotic symptoms independent of mood.14 However, it
remains unclear whether symptom development is influ-
enced by negative cognition and emotional dysregulation
or vice versa.
The current article is the first to test the plausibility of
these hypothesized causal links in a large clinical sample
involving longitudinal assessment of people with nonaf-
fective psychosis. The analyses formed an ancillary part
of the original protocol of the Psychological Prevention
of Relapse in Psychosis (PRP) Trial. This was a British
multicenter, randomized controlled trial of CBT and
family intervention for psychosis (ISRCTN83557988).
A comprehensive description of the trial and its methods
is provided elsewhere.29 For present purposes, we treated
the whole dataset as a cohort, utilizing data from base-
line, 3-month, and 12-month assessments. Participants
were selected on the basis that they had developed psy-
chosis some time previously. We were thus investigating
the factors that influenced the waxing and waning of psy-
chotic symptoms already established.
Our focus here is specifically on symptoms of paranoia.
We test associations between variables both within and
across time points (cross-sectional and cross-lagged rela-
tionships), using structural equation modeling (SEM) in
a nested model design. Our published cognitive model of
psychosis4,5 suggests that negative cognition (low self-es-
teem, self-critical thinking, and extreme negative beliefs
about self and others) and depressed mood can exacer-
bate and maintain paranoia. This contrasts with tradi-
tional views, which argue that emotional dysfunction is
a natural consequence of the occurrence of paranoid
states, with little etiological significance. Our aim was
therefore to assess the plausibility of specific directional
pathways leading from negative cognition and depressed
mood to paranoia. The key test was the degree to which
models incorporating specific directional pathways from
negative cognition and depressed mood to paranoia
would provide a better fit than those where the pathways
were in the opposite direction. Our second prediction was
that the effect of depressed mood on paranoia would be
mediated by negative cognition. This was tested by exam-
ining the pattern of associations within a model that ex-
amined how the combination of negative cognition and
depressed mood was associated with paranoia.
Methods
Participants
Participants were recruited from consecutive clients of
Community Mental Health. Teams based in inner and
outer London and in the rural county of Norfolk.
They had experienced a relapse in positive symptoms
within the last 3 months and had a current diagnosis
of nonaffective psychosis (schizophrenia, schizoaffective
disorder, and delusional disorder). They were aged 18–65
years and were required to have a rating of at least 4
(moderate severity) on the Positive and Negative Syn-
drome Scale (PANSS) on at least 1 positive psychotic
symptom at initial interview. The current study used
data from all participants in the PRP trial (N = 301). Se-
venty percent of the sample was male, and the mean age
was 37.6 years (SD = 11.0 y). Sixty-eight percent had been
admitted to hospital as a consequence of their recent re-
lapse in psychosis. Seventy-two percent described them-
selves as White-British, 8% as Black-Caribbean, 9% as
Black-African, and 11% as from other ethnic back-
grounds. Eighty-five percent had a diagnosis of schizo-
phrenia, 13% of schizoaffective disorder, and 2% of
delusional disorder. The mean length of illness was
10.7 years (SD = 8.9 y), ranging from less than 1–44 years.
Measures
Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms. The
Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS)
is a 35-item 6-point (0–5) rating instrument administered
by an interviewer. Symptoms are rated over the last
month. Item 8, which specifically rates persecutory delu-
sions, was used in the current analysis.30
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale. The PANSS is
a 30-item 7-point (1–7) rating instrument, also inter-
viewer-administered, of the phenomena associated with
schizophrenia.31 Symptoms are rated over the last 72
hours. In the current analysis, we used item 6, which spe-
cifically rates suspiciousness and paranoia.
BriefCoreSchemaScales. TheBriefCoreSchemaScales
(BCSS) is a 24-item 5-point self-report rating scale (0–4)
assessing evaluative beliefs about the self and others.27 It
was designed to create a quick and easy-to-use assessment
of thetypeofextremeevaluationsofselfandothers thatare
adefining featureofpeoplewithpsychosis.Four scoresare
obtained:negative self (6 items),positive self (6 items),neg-
ative others (6 items), and positive others (6 items). The
BCSS has good reliability and internal consistency, with
Cronbach#s a coefficients >.78. Principal components
analysis revealed a 4-component solution (consistent
with the 4 subscale scores), accounting for 57% of the var-
iance. The negative self-items in the BCSS measure
strongly held negative self-evaluations (eg, I am bad, I
amworthless)andprovideanoperationalconstructofneg-
ative schematic self-beliefs.
BeckDepression Inventory The Beck Depression Inven-
tory (BDI-II) is a 21-item self-report scale rated on a 4-
point scale (0–3) of increasing severity, designed to assess
symptoms of depression occurring over the past 2
weeks.32 The BDI-II consists of 2 factors: negative
. o ler et al.
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cognition (9 items; eg, self-dislike) and affective-somatic
feelings (12 items; eg, loss of pleasure) and has been
shown to have good psychometric properties. Moreover,
it has been used in many studies with patients with psy-
chosis33 and correlated at 0.91 with the interview-based
Calgary Depression Scale for Schizophrenia.34
Analysis Plan
SEM is a confirmatory data analysis technique. The ap-
proach is theoretically driven, allowing a priori theoret-
ical models to be applied to observed data, following
which goodness of fit can be ascertained. We took a 2-
step approach to the analysis, as follows.
Latent Variable Identification. The SEM technique
encourages the creation of factors that incorporate
more than 1 source of measurement for any 1 single con-
struct. The present analysis used 3 such factors: paranoia,
negative cognition, and depressed mood.
Paranoia The paranoia latent variable was predicted
by the ‘‘persecutory delusions’’ item from the SAPS (item
8) and the ‘‘suspiciousness/persecution’’ item from the
PANSS (item P6). The factor loadings of these items
were 0.89 and 0.94, respectively.
Negative Cognition The main hypotheses of the
present study required a negative cognition latent vari-
able. For this purpose, we combined the negative belief
about self-subscale of the BCSS and the negative cogni-
tion subscale of the BDI-II (factor loadings of 0.82 and
0.86, respectively). We could have based our primary
modeling on a negative cognition latent variable based
only on BCSS subscales. However, we have already
reported that there is considerable independence
between the different aspects of beliefs about self and
others identified by the BCSS.27 As a result, the
prediction of individual BCSS subscales to the latent
variable was uneven, with factor loadings of individual
subscales of negative self, 0.77; negative other, 0.58; pos-
itive self, �0.43; and positive other, �0.32. The negative
schema factor was thereby made less stable for modeling
purposes. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we
also report on models obtained by constructing the neg-
ative cognition latent variable only from the BCSS
variables.
DepressedMood The depressed mood latent variable
was predicted by the combination of the individual items
of affective-somatic factor of the BDI-II as suggested by
the original psychometric analysis of the scale. It thus
excluded the negative cognitions subscale of the BDI-II.
ModelHypotheses. In the second stage of analysis, a se-
ries of 3-wave panel analyses (using data from baseline, 3-
month, and 12-month assessments) were conducted using
MPlus version 435 to test the longitudinal relationships of
negative cognition and depressed mood with paranoia. A
nested model comparison approach was used to assess
relative changes in goodness of fit associated with the ad-
dition of paths between constructs.36 A number of theo-
retically plausible models were identified a priori, and our
hypotheses were tested by comparing the fit of thesemod-
els. The comparison of goodness of fit was examined by
chi-square tests, the root mean square error of approxi-
mation (RMSEA),37 and the comparative fit index
(CFI).38
Following recommendations for nested model
designs,36 the starting point of the panel wave analysis
was the estimation of the model consisting solely of auto-
correlations, ie, the correlations between earlier and later
time points within the variables (paranoia, negative cog-
nition, and depressed mood). We then tested hypotheses
through the sequential addition of specific pathways be-
tween variables. First, we assessed the significance of
changes in model fit resulting from the addition to the
autocorrelational model of directional pathways leading
from paranoia either to negative cognition or to de-
pressed mood. Next, we assessed the significance of add-
ing to the autocorrelational model the directional
pathways leading in the opposite direction, from negative
cognition or from depressed mood to paranoia. If the ad-
ditional pathways in either direction improved model fit
significantly, the third step was to assess whether the in-
corporation of both directions of effect (ie, a reciprocal
model) improved fit still further. The guiding principle in
this hypothesis testing approach is that if adding a given
path does not significantly improve the fit, themodel with
fewer paths (thereby the more parsimonious) must be
regarded as superior.
This sequence was followed in the analysis of 3 differ-
ent kinds of theoretically plausible model, which were
set up a priori for testing against the autocorrelational
model. To understand these models, it may be helpful to
inspect the path diagrams in figures 1–3 in conjunction
with the text at this point. The first type was a cross-sec-
tional (sometimes called recursive) model incorporating
only the within-time point paths linking paranoia with
negative cognition or depressed mood (as in figures 1a
and 2a). The second type was a cross-lagged model (as in
figures 1b and 2b). These models contained cross-lagged
paths between variables at time t and variables at time
tþ 1. They are a more powerful test of the plausibility of
causal directions because of the temporal displacement
of the measurements. The third type of model (shown in
the tables but not in the figures) included both cross-sec-
tional and cross-lagged links.
Finally, in figure 3, we illustrate a model showing the
impact on paranoia of depressed mood and negative
cognition in combination. The purpose of this model
was to test the hypotheses that negative cognition would
have the strongest independent associations with para-
noia and would mediate the effect of the affective-so-
matic dimension of depressed mood on paranoia.
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the factors that influenced the waxing and waning of psy-
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bate and maintain paranoia. This contrasts with tradi-
tional views, which argue that emotional dysfunction is
a natural consequence of the occurrence of paranoid
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therefore to assess the plausibility of specific directional
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mood to paranoia. The key test was the degree to which
models incorporating specific directional pathways from
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data from all participants in the PRP trial (N = 301). Se-
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10.7 years (SD = 8.9 y), ranging from less than 1–44 years.
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is a 35-item 6-point (0–5) rating instrument administered
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month. Item 8, which specifically rates persecutory delu-
sions, was used in the current analysis.30
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale. The PANSS is
a 30-item 7-point (1–7) rating instrument, also inter-
viewer-administered, of the phenomena associated with
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cifically rates suspiciousness and paranoia.
BriefCoreSchemaScales. TheBriefCoreSchemaScales
(BCSS) is a 24-item 5-point self-report rating scale (0–4)
assessing evaluative beliefs about the self and others.27 It
was designed to create a quick and easy-to-use assessment
of thetypeofextremeevaluationsofselfandothers thatare
adefining featureofpeoplewithpsychosis.Four scoresare
obtained:negative self (6 items),positive self (6 items),neg-
ative others (6 items), and positive others (6 items). The
BCSS has good reliability and internal consistency, with
Cronbach#s a coefficients >.78. Principal components
analysis revealed a 4-component solution (consistent
with the 4 subscale scores), accounting for 57% of the var-
iance. The negative self-items in the BCSS measure
strongly held negative self-evaluations (eg, I am bad, I
amworthless)andprovideanoperationalconstructofneg-
ative schematic self-beliefs.
BeckDepression Inventory The Beck Depression Inven-
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percent of the sample reported persecutory delusions
rated moderate to severe on the SAPS.
Structural Equation Modeling
Negative Cognition and Paranoia. The overall fit was
good for all models under all criteria, except for the
RMSEA criterion for the cross-sectional model linking
paranoia to negative cognition (table 2).
There was no evidence in support of directional path-
ways leading from paranoia to negative cognition.
Compared with the autocorrelational model, the cross-
lagged model was not significantly different, while the
cross-sectional model incorporating these pathways
was actually a significantly worse fit.
Conversely, and consistent with our hypothesis, in
both cross-sectional and cross-lagged models, the inclu-
sion of pathways leading from negative self-schemas to
paranoia fitted significantly better than the autocorrela-
tional model (table 2). This was true also of the model
incorporating both cross-sectional and cross-lagged
pathways. However, this model did not represent a signif-
icant improvement in fit over the cross-sectional model
(Dv2 = 3.6; df = 1; P = .06) or the cross-lagged model
(Dv2 = 0.2; df = 1; P = .65). Moreover, it is less parsimo-
nious than models incorporating either cross-sectional or
a) Depressed mood and paranoia cross-sectional model
b) Depressed mood and paranoia cross-lagged model
**17.0**27.0
**75.0**36.0
**49.0**88.0 **39.0**98.0
P1 P2 P3
0.19** 0.14**
0.94** 0.89**
0.18**
PANSS 3 SAPS 3 PANSS 12 SAPS 12PANSS 0 SAPS 0
0.06
M1 M2 M3
BDI_4
3
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3
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0
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PANSS 3 SAPS 3 PANSS 12 SAPS 12PANSS 0 SAPS 0
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BDI_4
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12
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0
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0
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0
0.06
0.12** 0.12**
Fig. 2.Depressed mood and paranoia. *P < .05, **P < .01, ***P < .001. P1, paranoia at T1; P2, paranoia at T2; P3, paranoia at T3; M1,
depressed mood at T1; M2, depressed mood at T2; M3, depressed mood at T3.
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Models with RMSEA values below 0.08 are considered
to have a good fit, those with values above 0.10 indicating
a poor fit. CFI values above 0.90 and nonsignificant chi-
square values also indicate a good fit to the data.
However, as the chi-square statistic is dependent on sample
size, and likely to reject well-fitting models in moderately
large samples such as ours,39 the use of multiple measures
of fit was deemed appropriate. The key statistic used to
evaluate tests of hypotheses relating to changes in model
fit as a result of adding in directional pathways in this study
was the significance of differences in chi-square values be-
tween autocorrelational and directional pathway models.
Participants with incomplete data were included in the
analysis on the assumption that the data were missing
at random.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Themean scores for the psychotic symptom, schema, and
depression measures are presented in table 1. Fifty-four
a) Negative cognition and paranoia cross-sectional model  
b) Negative cognition and paranoia cross-lagged model 
**45.0**37.0
**65.0**16.0
0.24** 0.15**
0.86** **78.0**28.0 **68.0**38.0 0.82**
0.94** **49.0**88.0 **39.0**98.0 0.89**
0.23**
C1 C2 C3
NegSelf
3
BDI_Cog
3
NegSelf
0
BDI_Cog
0
NegSelf
12
BDI_Cog
12
P1 P2 P3
PANSS 3 SAPS 3 PANSS 12 SAPS 12PANSS 0 SAPS 0
0.11
0.05
**97.0**88.0
**95.0**36.0
0.86** **78.0**38.0 **68.0**38.0 0.82**
0.93** **29.0**98.0 **29.0**09.0 0.90**
0.24**
C1 C2 C3
NegSelf
3
BDI_Cog
3
NegSelf
0
BDI_Cog
0
NegSelf
12
BDI_Cog
12
P1 P2 P3
PANSS 3 SAPS 3 PANSS 12 SAPS 12PANSS 0 SAPS 0
0.06
0.03
0.14** 0.14**
Fig. 1.Negative cognition and paranoia. *P< .05, **P< .01, ***P< 0.001. P1, paranoia at T1; P2, paranoia at T2; P3, paranoia at T3; C1,
negative cognition at T1; C2, negative cogniton at T2; C3, negative cognition at T3; Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) 0,
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percent of the sample reported persecutory delusions
rated moderate to severe on the SAPS.
Structural Equation Modeling
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good for all models under all criteria, except for the
RMSEA criterion for the cross-sectional model linking
paranoia to negative cognition (table 2).
There was no evidence in support of directional path-
ways leading from paranoia to negative cognition.
Compared with the autocorrelational model, the cross-
lagged model was not significantly different, while the
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was actually a significantly worse fit.
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the model did not significantly improve fit over the cross-
sectional model (Dv2 = 0.2; df = 1; P = .65) or the cross-
lagged model (Dv2 = 1.4; df = 1; P = .24).
The inclusion of reciprocal pathways did not signifi-
cantly add to the unidirectional models linking depressed
mood to paranoia, whether cross-sectional or cross-
lagged.
Negative Cognition, Depressed Mood, and Paranoia. In
order to determine how mood and cognition combine
in the maintenance of paranoia, we carried out a more
complex panel analysis. This included all 3 latent varia-
bles (negative self-schemas and depressed mood as inde-
pendent variables and paranoia as the dependent
variable). The best-fitting model is illustrated in figure
3 and indicates that mood and cognition were recipro-
cally associated. However, only negative cognition had
an additional and independent association with para-
noia, with a significant coefficient of .33 in the pathway
from negative cognition to paranoia. The fit of the overall
model was ambiguous, being good only in respect of the
RMSEA criterion (v2 [1068] = 2099.03, P < .05; CFI =
0.84; RMSEA = 0.06).
Models Incorporating Other Negative Schema Factors
We also ran models using factors derived from other
combinations of BCSS subscales. Strikingly, they all fol-
lowed the same pattern, in that, paranoia was predicted
by every type of negative belief factor used, but the
reverse was never true. However, the fit for the models
using these combinations of BCSS subscales as the neg-
ative schema factor was weaker than for those using the
factor restricted to negative beliefs about the self. The fit
of the cross-lagged model using the schema latent vari-
able combining negative self and lack of positive self
(loadings 0.67 and 0.53, respectively) was denoted by
chi-square = 164.43, df = 53, P < .0001, CFI = 0.93,
RMSEA = 0.08. The fit of the cross-lagged model using
the schema latent variable deriving from combining all
BCSS subscales was denoted by chi-square = 600.07, P
< .001, CFI = 0.79, RMSEA = 0.11.
Discussion
Affective dysregulation is very common even in so-called
nonaffective psychosis. The concept of depression incor-
porates distinguishable emotional and cognitive compo-
nents. In this study, we used our cognitive model of
psychosis to derive key hypotheses linking paranoia to
these components,2,4,11,27 which we then tested in people
identified by having experienced a psychotic relapse.
Seventy percent were male, typical of samples acquired
in this way. While this was a treatment trial, there
were no overall differences between the control and
experimental groups in the variables tested here. It was
therefore justifiable to treat the whole sample as a cohort.
Specifically, we hypothesized that there would be clear
evidence supporting directional pathways leading from
negative cognition and depressed mood to paranoid
Table 2. Cross-Sectional and Cross-Lagged Models Linking Negative Cognition and Paranoia
v2 df RMSEA CFI Dv2
Cross-sectional
Baseline (autocorrelational) model 160.9 54 0.08 0.95
Model 1 (paranoia to negative
self-schemas)
175.3 53 0.09 0.94
Difference between baseline and Model 1 1 14.42***
Model 2 (negative self-schemas to
paranoia)
154.2 53 0.08 0.95
Difference between baseline and Model 2 1 6.73***
Cross-lagged
Baseline (autocorrelational) model 160.9 54 0.08 0.95
Model 1 (paranoia to negative
self-schemas)
157.2 53 0.08 0.95
Difference between baseline and Model 1 1 3.65
Model 2 (negative self-schemas to
paranoia)
149.8 53 0.08 0.95
Difference between baseline and Model 2 1 11.11***
Cross-sectional and cross-lagged combined
Baseline model 160.9 54 0.08 0.95
Model 1 (paranoia to negative cognition) 157.8 52 0.08 0.95
Difference between baseline and Model 1 2 3.14
Model 2 (negative cognition to paranoia) 150.6 52 0.08 0.95
Difference between baseline and Model 2 2 10.31**
Note: RMSEA, root mean square error of approximation; CFI, comparative fit index.
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cross-lagged paths. The best-fitting models are therefore
the cross-sectional model, in which negative cognition pre-
dicts paranoia within time points, as shown in figure 1a
and the equivalent cross-lagged model in figure 1b.
We also tested models with reciprocal pathways link-
ing negative cognition and paranoia, not included in the
figures or tables. The cross-sectional version was not
significantly different from the unidirectional cross-
sectional model presented in figure 1a. However, the re-
ciprocal cross-lagged model, ie, one including pathways
going forward in time, and linking both negative self-
schemas with paranoia, and paranoia with negative
self-schemas, fitted the data well (v2 [52] = 145.22, P >
.05; CFI = 0.96; RMSEA = 0.08). This represented a rel-
atively small but significant improvement in fit over the
unidirectional model linking negative self-schemas to
paranoia, as shown in figure 1b (Dv2 = 4.6; df = 1;
P = .03). This raises the possibility that while the predom-
inant direction is clearly from negative cognition to
paranoia, there may be some additional contribution
from reciprocal relationships.
Depressed Mood and Paranoia. Goodness of fit indices
for cross-sectional and cross-lagged models linking
depressed mood and paranoia are shown in table 3, while
the models themselves are illustrated in figure 2. There
was a consistent discrepancy in the indices, in that fit
appeared good using RMSEA, but was poor when
assessed by the CFI. Despite this, the overall pattern
of results was similar to that for negative cognition.
Thus, models incorporating pathways leading from para-
noia to depressed mood did not fit the data significantly
better than the autocorrelational model. (In fact, the
model incorporating cross-sectional paths was signifi-
cantly worse). By contrast, there were significant
improvements in model fit with the addition of either
cross-sectional or cross-lagged pathways leading from
depressed mood to paranoia. The coefficients in the de-
pressed mood to paranoia pathways were all significant
(0.19 and 0.14, respectively, in the cross-sectional model
and 0.12 and 0.12, respectively, in the cross-lagged
model). Table 3 also displays the model incorporating
both cross-sectional and cross-lagged pathways. Again,
0.17**
-0.02
P1 P2 P3
C1 C2 C3
M1 M2 M3
0.02
0.43** 0.33** 0.43** 0.33**
81.0**33.0
0.06
**75.0**26.0
**75.0**94.0
**04.0**44.0
0.82**
0.21**
0.15**
0.04
Negative cognition and depressed mood on paranoia combined cross-sectional model
Fig. 3.Negative cognitionanddepressedmoodonparanoiacombinedcross sectionalmodel. *P< .05, **P< .01, ***P< .001.P1,paranoiaat
T1; P2, paranoia at T2; P3, paranoia at T3; C1, negative cognition at T1; C2, negative cognition at T2; C3, negative cognition at T3; M1,
depressed mood at T1; M2, depressed mood at T2; M3, depressed mood at T3.
Table 1. Means and SD for All Variables
Time 1 (Baseline) Time 2 (3 mo) Time 3 (12 mo)
N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD
PANSS paranoia 301 3.49 1.65 257 2.95 1.68 248 2.88 1.65
SAPS persecution 301 2.35 1.80 258 1.74 1.76 248 1.69 1.70
BCSS negative self 255 7.19 5.89 221 6.11 5.89 211 5.50 5.59
BCSS negative other 253 8.97 6.81 217 8.10 7.42 207 6.97 6.60
BDI-II 272 22.17 13.15 238 20.30 13.45 226 16.84 13.39
Note: PANSS, Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale; SAPS, Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms; BCSS, Brief Core
Schema Scales; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory. All participants had to have data at at least one time point to be included in the
modeling.
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the model did not significantly improve fit over the cross-
sectional model (Dv2 = 0.2; df = 1; P = .65) or the cross-
lagged model (Dv2 = 1.4; df = 1; P = .24).
The inclusion of reciprocal pathways did not signifi-
cantly add to the unidirectional models linking depressed
mood to paranoia, whether cross-sectional or cross-
lagged.
Negative Cognition, Depressed Mood, and Paranoia. In
order to determine how mood and cognition combine
in the maintenance of paranoia, we carried out a more
complex panel analysis. This included all 3 latent varia-
bles (negative self-schemas and depressed mood as inde-
pendent variables and paranoia as the dependent
variable). The best-fitting model is illustrated in figure
3 and indicates that mood and cognition were recipro-
cally associated. However, only negative cognition had
an additional and independent association with para-
noia, with a significant coefficient of .33 in the pathway
from negative cognition to paranoia. The fit of the overall
model was ambiguous, being good only in respect of the
RMSEA criterion (v2 [1068] = 2099.03, P < .05; CFI =
0.84; RMSEA = 0.06).
Models Incorporating Other Negative Schema Factors
We also ran models using factors derived from other
combinations of BCSS subscales. Strikingly, they all fol-
lowed the same pattern, in that, paranoia was predicted
by every type of negative belief factor used, but the
reverse was never true. However, the fit for the models
using these combinations of BCSS subscales as the neg-
ative schema factor was weaker than for those using the
factor restricted to negative beliefs about the self. The fit
of the cross-lagged model using the schema latent vari-
able combining negative self and lack of positive self
(loadings 0.67 and 0.53, respectively) was denoted by
chi-square = 164.43, df = 53, P < .0001, CFI = 0.93,
RMSEA = 0.08. The fit of the cross-lagged model using
the schema latent variable deriving from combining all
BCSS subscales was denoted by chi-square = 600.07, P
< .001, CFI = 0.79, RMSEA = 0.11.
Discussion
Affective dysregulation is very common even in so-called
nonaffective psychosis. The concept of depression incor-
porates distinguishable emotional and cognitive compo-
nents. In this study, we used our cognitive model of
psychosis to derive key hypotheses linking paranoia to
these components,2,4,11,27 which we then tested in people
identified by having experienced a psychotic relapse.
Seventy percent were male, typical of samples acquired
in this way. While this was a treatment trial, there
were no overall differences between the control and
experimental groups in the variables tested here. It was
therefore justifiable to treat the whole sample as a cohort.
Specifically, we hypothesized that there would be clear
evidence supporting directional pathways leading from
negative cognition and depressed mood to paranoid
Table 2. Cross-Sectional and Cross-Lagged Models Linking Negative Cognition and Paranoia
v2 df RMSEA CFI Dv2
Cross-sectional
Baseline (autocorrelational) model 160.9 54 0.08 0.95
Model 1 (paranoia to negative
self-schemas)
175.3 53 0.09 0.94
Difference between baseline and Model 1 1 14.42***
Model 2 (negative self-schemas to
paranoia)
154.2 53 0.08 0.95
Difference between baseline and Model 2 1 6.73***
Cross-lagged
Baseline (autocorrelational) model 160.9 54 0.08 0.95
Model 1 (paranoia to negative
self-schemas)
157.2 53 0.08 0.95
Difference between baseline and Model 1 1 3.65
Model 2 (negative self-schemas to
paranoia)
149.8 53 0.08 0.95
Difference between baseline and Model 2 1 11.11***
Cross-sectional and cross-lagged combined
Baseline model 160.9 54 0.08 0.95
Model 1 (paranoia to negative cognition) 157.8 52 0.08 0.95
Difference between baseline and Model 1 2 3.14
Model 2 (negative cognition to paranoia) 150.6 52 0.08 0.95
Difference between baseline and Model 2 2 10.31**
Note: RMSEA, root mean square error of approximation; CFI, comparative fit index.
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cross-lagged paths. The best-fitting models are therefore
the cross-sectional model, in which negative cognition pre-
dicts paranoia within time points, as shown in figure 1a
and the equivalent cross-lagged model in figure 1b.
We also tested models with reciprocal pathways link-
ing negative cognition and paranoia, not included in the
figures or tables. The cross-sectional version was not
significantly different from the unidirectional cross-
sectional model presented in figure 1a. However, the re-
ciprocal cross-lagged model, ie, one including pathways
going forward in time, and linking both negative self-
schemas with paranoia, and paranoia with negative
self-schemas, fitted the data well (v2 [52] = 145.22, P >
.05; CFI = 0.96; RMSEA = 0.08). This represented a rel-
atively small but significant improvement in fit over the
unidirectional model linking negative self-schemas to
paranoia, as shown in figure 1b (Dv2 = 4.6; df = 1;
P = .03). This raises the possibility that while the predom-
inant direction is clearly from negative cognition to
paranoia, there may be some additional contribution
from reciprocal relationships.
Depressed Mood and Paranoia. Goodness of fit indices
for cross-sectional and cross-lagged models linking
depressed mood and paranoia are shown in table 3, while
the models themselves are illustrated in figure 2. There
was a consistent discrepancy in the indices, in that fit
appeared good using RMSEA, but was poor when
assessed by the CFI. Despite this, the overall pattern
of results was similar to that for negative cognition.
Thus, models incorporating pathways leading from para-
noia to depressed mood did not fit the data significantly
better than the autocorrelational model. (In fact, the
model incorporating cross-sectional paths was signifi-
cantly worse). By contrast, there were significant
improvements in model fit with the addition of either
cross-sectional or cross-lagged pathways leading from
depressed mood to paranoia. The coefficients in the de-
pressed mood to paranoia pathways were all significant
(0.19 and 0.14, respectively, in the cross-sectional model
and 0.12 and 0.12, respectively, in the cross-lagged
model). Table 3 also displays the model incorporating
both cross-sectional and cross-lagged pathways. Again,
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Time 1 (Baseline) Time 2 (3 mo) Time 3 (12 mo)
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PANSS paranoia 301 3.49 1.65 257 2.95 1.68 248 2.88 1.65
SAPS persecution 301 2.35 1.80 258 1.74 1.76 248 1.69 1.70
BCSS negative self 255 7.19 5.89 221 6.11 5.89 211 5.50 5.59
BCSS negative other 253 8.97 6.81 217 8.10 7.42 207 6.97 6.60
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Schema Scales; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory. All participants had to have data at at least one time point to be included in the
modeling.
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measurements in the present study (cf.).40,41 The strong
cross-sectional pathways would then arise because of
a causal effect of depressed mood and negative self-sche-
mas on paranoia and of autocorrelation between closely
adjacent levels of paranoia. Supporting evidence for this
interpretation comes from the use of the experience sam-
pling method by theMaastricht group.42–44 In these stud-
ies, clear affective responses to minor stress were
paralleled bymoment-to-moment variation in subtle pos-
itive psychotic experiences, in a manner consistent with
the present study.
The findings of our study also chime with cross-
sectional studies reporting that negative schematic beliefs
are associated with the persistence of paranoia14,15,28
and the observations of the influence of depression and
anxiety on the evolution of psychosis from nonclinical lon-
gitudinal studies on epidemiological cohorts.24,40,41,45–49
The central role of negative cognition in mediating the
effects of depressed mood on paranoia was also corrob-
orated by our results. When we fitted models analyzing
depressed mood, negative cognition, and paranoia to-
gether, the best fit involved reciprocal associations be-
tween mood and negative cognition, but the final
common pathway to paranoia was specifically via nega-
tive cognition. Depressed mood had no independent as-
sociation with paranoia in the presence of negative
cognition. This was consistent with our secondary hy-
pothesis that negative cognition would mediate the
link between depressed mood and paranoia.
It should be noted that the negative cognition latent
variable favored in our analyses derives both from the
negative beliefs about self-subscale and from the cogni-
tive factor derived from the BDI-II. The latter does con-
tain elements reflecting mood rather than cognition, and
some of the variance captured by the latent variable
might therefore be dependent on this element rather
than on cognition. However, this is relatively implausible:
The BDI-II cognitive factor is dominated by cognitive
items, and the original factor analysis suggested that it
is these items that most strongly carry the variance (hence
the term ‘‘cognitive factor’’). The latent variable most
closely based on mood items in the BDI-II had effects
that were clearly mediated by the cognitive variable. Fi-
nally, we ran models using a negative cognition variable
that excluded BDI-II items and was entirely cognitive.
This produced similar, although weaker, results.
The present longitudinal study represents a consider-
able advance on cross-sectional studies. Traditional
models of psychosis propose that depressed mood and
negative self-evaluative thinking are simply epiphenom-
ena and thus of no etiological importance. However, the
most plausible explanation of our findings across all
models is of a causal effect of self-critical and extreme
negative thinking and of depressed mood on paranoia
in people with established nonaffective psychosis. Never-
theless, although the longitudinal design is persuasive, the
study is still correlational and thus subject to reservations
about the interpretation of relationships. Moreover, al-
though the dominant models clearly represented the
best fit to the data, the fit of some models (in particular,
the combinedmodel in figure 3) was ambiguous, with dis-
crepancies between the conventional indices of fit. Nor
can we rule out confounding by unmeasured variables.
The ultimate test must therefore be experimental.
Our results are consistent with other studies suggesting
that the influence of social life events and family environ-
ment operate via effects on self and other appraisal and
emotional dysfunction.50–52 Some experimental manipu-
lations of controlled environments have been carried out
and are also consistent with these hypotheses.53–56 In
summary, there is increasingly strong evidence that de-
pressed and anxious mood states and the associated
self-critical and extreme negative thinking about self
and others may contribute to the symptoms of paranoia
occurring in people with established nonaffective psycho-
sis. The findings have important clinical implications:
They provide further support for the use of CBT for psy-
chosis, which already incorporates targeted therapeutic
strategies to address extreme negative thinking about
self and others.57
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symptoms and that negative cognition would comprise
the component of affective dysregulation directly respon-
sible for this relationship.
The results from the modeling were consistent with our
hypotheses. Both cross-sectional and cross-lagged analy-
ses indicated that models based on pathways where the
direction was from negative cognition or depressed
mood to paranoid symptoms had a better fit than those
where the pathways ran in the opposite direction. Indeed,
these analyses provided no evidence whatsoever that add-
ing pathways leading from paranoia to depressed mood
or to negative cognition significantly improved fit over an
autocorrelational model. The direction of effect sug-
gested by this modeling is therefore that hypothesized,
viz, from negative cognition and depressedmood to para-
noia. There was however some indication of weak recip-
rocal relationships, over and above the unidirectional
pathway from negative cognition to paranoia. This
would be credible as cognitive processes in psychosis
are likely to be complex and to some degree transactive.
Under some circumstances, a state of paranoia is likely to
make self-critical and negative thinking about the self-
worse, and this is not inconsistent with our cognitive
model of paranoia. Nevertheless, evidence for reciprocal
pathways was inconsistent: The overall pattern of find-
ings from our study is clearly consonant with the inter-
pretation that the dominant direction of effect is from
self-critical and negative thinking, and from depressed
mood, to paranoia.
These observations represent a significant advance
over cross-sectional studies, where assumptions of the
directionality of association must be especially tentative.
All cross-sectional and cross-lagged models corroborated
our hypotheses. However, the results from the cross-
lagged analyses have particular value as they identify
the sort of effects over time that can most plausibly be
interpreted as causal.
This consistent direction of pathway was also observed
inmodelscombiningbothcross-sectionalandcross-lagged
pathways. In these models, the coefficients for the cross-
laggedpathwayswere still apparent but no longer contrib-
uted significantly. It must however be remembered that
models incorporating both cross-sectional and cross-
lagged pathways are less parsimonious than those based
solely on cross-lagged relationships.
Nevertheless, it is worth considering the implications.
If, as appears, the strength of the cross-sectional relation-
ships swamp the effects that operate between time points,
the effects seen in models based solely on cross-lagged
relationships could merely be an artifact of suppressing
the cross-sectional pathways. The latter of course have
less authority in the postulation of causal direction. How-
ever, if so, it would require an explanation (1) for the
consistency of the cross-lagged pathways linking both
depressed mood and negative self-schemas with paranoia
and (2) for the conspicuous absence of links in the
reverse direction in any of the cross-sectional models.
Moreover, the models based solely on cross-sectional
relationships mirror the findings for the cross-lagged
relationships.
Thus, a more persuasive account may be that the rela-
tionship between, say, cognition at time t and paranoia at
time t þ 1 was mediated by cognition at time t þ 1 (me-
diation therefore, not by another variable, but by the
same variable at a different time). In particular, these
results are what would be expected if the observed direc-
tions of effect were genuinely causal but operated over
a much shorter period than the interval between
Table 3. Cross-Sectional and Cross-Lagged Models Linking Depressed Mood and Paranoia
v2 df RMSEA CFI Dv2
Cross-sectional
Baseline (autocorrelational) model 1489.4 815 0.05 0.86
Model 1 (paranoia to depressed mood) 1494.7 814 0.05 0.86
Difference between baseline and Model 1 1 5.30**
Model 2 (depressed mood to paranoia) 1483.2 814 0.05 0.86
Difference between baseline and Model 2 1 �6.21**
Cross-lagged
Baseline (autocorrelational) model 1489.4 815 0.05 0.86
Model 1 (paranoia to depressed mood) 1489.2 814 0.05 0.86
Difference between baseline and Model 1 1 �0.24
Model 2 (depressed mood to paranoia) 1481.6 814 0.05 0.86
Difference between baseline and Model 2 1 �7.81**
Cross-sectional and cross-lagged combined
Baseline model 1489.4 815 0.05 0.86
Model 1 (paranoia to low mood) 1486.7 813 0.05 0.86
Difference between baseline and Model 1 2 �2.70
Model 2 (low mood to paranoia) 1483.0 813 0.05 0.86
Difference between baseline and Model 2 2 �6.42**
Note: Abbreviations are explained in the footnote to table 2.
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measurements in the present study (cf.).40,41 The strong
cross-sectional pathways would then arise because of
a causal effect of depressed mood and negative self-sche-
mas on paranoia and of autocorrelation between closely
adjacent levels of paranoia. Supporting evidence for this
interpretation comes from the use of the experience sam-
pling method by theMaastricht group.42–44 In these stud-
ies, clear affective responses to minor stress were
paralleled bymoment-to-moment variation in subtle pos-
itive psychotic experiences, in a manner consistent with
the present study.
The findings of our study also chime with cross-
sectional studies reporting that negative schematic beliefs
are associated with the persistence of paranoia14,15,28
and the observations of the influence of depression and
anxiety on the evolution of psychosis from nonclinical lon-
gitudinal studies on epidemiological cohorts.24,40,41,45–49
The central role of negative cognition in mediating the
effects of depressed mood on paranoia was also corrob-
orated by our results. When we fitted models analyzing
depressed mood, negative cognition, and paranoia to-
gether, the best fit involved reciprocal associations be-
tween mood and negative cognition, but the final
common pathway to paranoia was specifically via nega-
tive cognition. Depressed mood had no independent as-
sociation with paranoia in the presence of negative
cognition. This was consistent with our secondary hy-
pothesis that negative cognition would mediate the
link between depressed mood and paranoia.
It should be noted that the negative cognition latent
variable favored in our analyses derives both from the
negative beliefs about self-subscale and from the cogni-
tive factor derived from the BDI-II. The latter does con-
tain elements reflecting mood rather than cognition, and
some of the variance captured by the latent variable
might therefore be dependent on this element rather
than on cognition. However, this is relatively implausible:
The BDI-II cognitive factor is dominated by cognitive
items, and the original factor analysis suggested that it
is these items that most strongly carry the variance (hence
the term ‘‘cognitive factor’’). The latent variable most
closely based on mood items in the BDI-II had effects
that were clearly mediated by the cognitive variable. Fi-
nally, we ran models using a negative cognition variable
that excluded BDI-II items and was entirely cognitive.
This produced similar, although weaker, results.
The present longitudinal study represents a consider-
able advance on cross-sectional studies. Traditional
models of psychosis propose that depressed mood and
negative self-evaluative thinking are simply epiphenom-
ena and thus of no etiological importance. However, the
most plausible explanation of our findings across all
models is of a causal effect of self-critical and extreme
negative thinking and of depressed mood on paranoia
in people with established nonaffective psychosis. Never-
theless, although the longitudinal design is persuasive, the
study is still correlational and thus subject to reservations
about the interpretation of relationships. Moreover, al-
though the dominant models clearly represented the
best fit to the data, the fit of some models (in particular,
the combinedmodel in figure 3) was ambiguous, with dis-
crepancies between the conventional indices of fit. Nor
can we rule out confounding by unmeasured variables.
The ultimate test must therefore be experimental.
Our results are consistent with other studies suggesting
that the influence of social life events and family environ-
ment operate via effects on self and other appraisal and
emotional dysfunction.50–52 Some experimental manipu-
lations of controlled environments have been carried out
and are also consistent with these hypotheses.53–56 In
summary, there is increasingly strong evidence that de-
pressed and anxious mood states and the associated
self-critical and extreme negative thinking about self
and others may contribute to the symptoms of paranoia
occurring in people with established nonaffective psycho-
sis. The findings have important clinical implications:
They provide further support for the use of CBT for psy-
chosis, which already incorporates targeted therapeutic
strategies to address extreme negative thinking about
self and others.57
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